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Croatia´s Course of Action
to Achieve EU Membership
1. Foreign policy orientation of the
Republic of Croatia
Working towards membership in the EU has been one of the main goals
of Croatian foreign policy strategy ever since the country became inde-
pendent and internationally recognised in 1991 and 1992. While firmly
pursuing its Euro-Atlantic priorities vis-à-vis the EU and NATO in the
1990’s, Croatia was forced, for a number of complex reasons, to concen-
trate primarily on resolving domestic issues, i.e., defending itself from
aggression, liberating the occupied territories, achieving territorial integ-
rity and re-establishing authority over its entire territory. At the same
time, Croatia supported efforts to achieve peace and stability in neigh-
bouring Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H).
The Croatian Government’s goal to adjust its institutions to those of the
EU as quickly as possible is shared by the overwhelming majority of po-
litical parties in Croatia. Moreover, there is broad national consensus on
the necessity to move closer to the EU. This includes economic, scientific
and professional circles as well as representatives of civil groups.
Croatia experienced its key democratic transformation in the first demo-
cratic elections in 1990 when it ousted the single-party dictatorship and
endorsed a pluralistic multiparty system. Unlike most of the other states
in Central and Eastern Europe, Croatia is going through a double transi-Ivo Sanader
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tion: the usual transition from a planned to a free market economy and, in
addition, the transition from a defence-oriented wartime economy to a
peacetime one.
The completion of the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube re-
gion on 15 January 1998 marked the actual beginning of peacetime devel-
opment, including the foreign policy of gradually creating conditions to
intensify activities aimed at moving closer towards the EU.
Over the past years, Croatia has established good, even partner-like rela-
tions with international peacekeeping and monitoring missions as a result
of its co-operative attitude and transparent co-operation with the interna-
tional community within the framework of the crisis management for
countries of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY). To date the following UN missions have operated in Croatia: the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Con-
fidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), the United Nations
Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium (UNTAES), the United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG)
and the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP), the
latter of which is still active. In addition, the European Community
Monitor Mission has been present in Croatia since 1991, and during the
past few years the OSCE has been primarily responsible for monitoring
the work of the police in the Croatian Danube region, ensuring that life is
normalising in the liberated areas, and monitoring the democratisation
process.
When it comes to regional stability, Croatia has played a significant role
in creating the conditions that led to the signing of the 1995 Dayton Peace
Accords for B-H. In this regard, Croatia continues to fully support the
implementation of the Accords, which, together with the Washington Ac-
cords, guarantee a peaceful and stable development, while extending reli-
able protection to and ensuring the survival of the Croatian population in
B-H as one of the three constituent peoples of that country.Craotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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By signing the Agreement on the Normalisation of Relations with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Croatia boldly initiated the sensi-
tive process of regulating its relations with the very country that started
the aggression that resulted in such grave consequences for Croatia and its
people.
Since the beginning of the activities of SFOR and IFOR in B-H, Croatia
has given them logistic and political support, thus confirming its strategic
role as a generator of peace and unavoidable factor of stability in the re-
gion.
Having become a member of the OSCE in 1992, Croatia took a big step
forward in 1996 by being admitted to the Council of Europe as its fortieth
Member State. This in itself acknowledges the fact that Croatia is dedi-
cated to consolidating democracy, the rule of law and the protection of
human rights.
Upon its admission to the Council of Europe, Croatia signed the basic
conventions, the most important of which is the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In addition,
Croatia undertook a number of commitments whose fulfilment is moni-
tored by the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe.
As the presiding state of the Central European Initiative (CEI) in 1998,
Croatia showed with its constructive approach that it is strategically inter-
ested in developing regional co-operation and good neighbourly relations.
Croatia has also attempted to reinforce the political dialogue between the
CEI and the EU, thus significantly reaffirming its Central-European ori-
entation and identity. In the year 2000, Croatia will take over the presi-
dency of the Working Group of the Danube Regions, which will serve as
an excellent opportunity to internationally promote its role as a Danube
State and show others the peacetime atmosphere of the region at large.
Supporting the idea of the Republic of Italy to establish an Adriatic Initia-
tive, Croatia is still fully engaged in the preparatory activities to institu-Ivo Sanader
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tionalise co-operation in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. Similarly, Croatia
actively participates in the preparation of further reforms to be carried out
by the Alpin-Adriatic Working Group, of which it has been a member
since 1978.
Croatia is undertaking efforts to complete negotiations on its admission to
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by the end of 1999. Realisation of
this important goal will provide new impetus for the conclusion of free
trade agreements with the Member States of the Central European Free
Trade Agreement (CEFTA), one of the priorities of Croatia.
In light of new developments in the region in 1999, Croatia hopes to im-
prove current relations with the EU by intensifying political dialogue and
technical assistance, with the aim of establishing contractual relations in
the near future.
2. Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the
European Union up to 1999
With the tectonic changes in the geopolitical map of Europe, commencing
with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the collapse of the complete
socialist system in Central and Eastern Europe, the new democracies
turned to Western Europe with the intention of adopting its institutions.
Under such circumstances, the EU (i.e. the EC) closely followed the re-
spective processes by means of which the individual states acquired inde-
pendence or former federations were dissolved, establishing certain re-
quirements which all new states had to meet, on equal terms, in order to
gain international recognition.
As regards the dissolution of the former SFRY in 1991, the EC played an
important role in the attempt to prevent conflicts and find a solution to the
looming crisis. Regarding the issue as a predominantly European one, the
EC practised preventive diplomacy by engaging mechanisms of the Euro-
pean Political Co-operation, making frequent Troika visits, and presentingCraotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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various proposals, all in an attempt to prevent the conflict from escalating
and spreading.
Regretfully, these efforts remained futile despite the good will. Serbian
(Yugoslav) aggression struck heavily first in Slovenia, then in Croatia, B-
H, and more recently and hopefully for the last time, in Kosovo. From
the viewpoint of the EC, the timing of the crisis in the former SFRY
could not have been worse. At that time the EC Member States were en-
tering the final round of negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty on the
European Union.
Further involvement of the EC (i.e. the EU) in resolving the crisis oc-
curred within the framework of the Peace Conferences on the former
SFRY to which it appointed peace mediators, first the British diplomats
Peter Carrington and David Owen, and finally the Swedish diplomat Carl
Bildt.
Based on the opinions of the Badinter Commission, strong political sup-
port from individual EC Member States and the general agreement that
the specified requirements had been met, the then twelve EC Member
States recognised Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states on 15 January
1992.
In the autumn of 1991, the European Community Monitor Mission
(ECMM) for the former SFRY was established for the purpose of gath-
ering information on conditions in the field. The delegates came from the
ranks of the then Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE) to the EC Member States; however, monitors from other CSCE
Members States also participated. During the Austrian Presidency of the
EU, a Memorandum of Understanding in respect of the ECMM activities
in Croatia was signed in December 1998. Among other things, the pre-
amble stressed the need to continue developing mutual political and eco-
nomic activities and intensify the political dialogue.
Since Croatia has no contractual relations with the EU and the 1980 Co-
operation Agreement with the former SFRY was rescinded by a decisionIvo Sanader
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of the EU Council of Ministers of 25 November 1991 (under which
Croatia had some institutional contacts with the EC in its capacity as one
of the republics of former Yugoslavia), mutual trade relations are regu-
lated by unilateral provisions of the EU Council of Ministers. That is to
say, since 1992, the EC, i.e. EU Council of Ministers has regularly re-
newed the autonomous trade preferences at the beginning of each year.
In regard to the PHARE programme, the most important instrument of
EU assistance to countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, it
should be noted that Croatia was among the few states that could not
benefit from these funds throughout the 1990’s. It was only during the
short period between the two military and police operations “Flash” and
“Storm”, which liberated occupied territories, that Croatia was formally a
beneficiary of PHARE funds, i.e., between 12 June 1995 and 4 August
1995. However, despite thorough preparations by Croatia, co-ordinated
by the then National PHARE Co-ordinator and later by Prime Minister
Zlatko Mateša in co-operation with EU experts, the Memorandum signed
with the European Commission in respect to certain projects, primarily
for the infrastructure, was never implemented.
The Co-operation Agreement between Croatia and the EU experienced a
similar fate. After several rounds of negotiations, only a small number of
open issues remained relating to lists of goods in the Annexes to the
Agreement. At that time the EU Council of Ministers unilaterally froze
implementation of the PHARE programme in Croatia by virtue of a deci-
sion of 4 August 1995, as a result of which negotiations on the Co-
operation Agreement were suspended. The then Draft Co-operation
Agreement was a somewhat more elaborate version of the first generation
of agreements which the EU (pursuant to Art. 113 of the Treaty estab-
lishing the EEC) concluded with Central and Eastern European states,
e.g. with Slovenia in 1993. However, unlike the Slovenian draft, at the
time the negotiations were suspended, consensus could not be reached on
the so-called evolution clause, which implies the eventual conclusion ofCraotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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an Association Agreement. This was due primarily to resistance on the
part of the European Commission.
The chief negotiators on behalf of Croatia were the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Dr. Mate Graniæ, his Deputy, Dr. Ivo Sanader, and the then As-
sistant Foreign Minister, Davor Štern. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
acted as the main national agency responsible for co-ordinating political
and operative activities connected with the EU. Pursuant to the above-
mentioned decision of the Government, the Foreign Policy Co-ordination
played an important role in preparing materials for a similar but extended
Croatian negotiating team.
After the signing of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, the EU inaugu-
rated the Process of Good-neighbourliness and Co-operation known as the
Royaumont Process. Croatia was actively involved in the activities from
the very beginning, with palpable results achieved in the co-operation
between NGOs, media and scientific groups.
In recent years, the EU and individual EU Member States have given
Croatia valuable humanitarian aid, as well as financial assistance to help
rebuild the areas devastated during the war. In this sense, the EU Mem-
ber States were the most generous donors at the Conference for the Re-
construction and Development of the Republic of Croatia held in Decem-
ber 1998.  According to the latest information of the European Commis-
sion, the EU allocated 349.7 million Euro during the period from 1991 to
1999, and the Member States bilaterally a total of 1165.9 million Euro
(1990-1997), i.e., a total of 1515.6 million Euro. Another 511.0 million
Euro from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
should be added to this figure.  It should be noted that Croatia benefited
neither from PHARE funds nor from EIB loans. Furthermore, Croatia’s
received no direct assistance from the European Union to offset its bal-
ance of payments.
Since 1996, political relations between Croatia and the EU have been
dominated by the regional policy approach adopted by the EU for the
states of Southeast Europe: Croatia, B-H, Yugoslavia, Macedonia andIvo Sanader
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Albania. The main goal of the regional policy is to achieve peace and sta-
bility in the region, while attempting to effectively implement the Dayton
and Erdut Agreements.
As set forth in a proposal of the European Commission, in April 1997 the
Council of Ministers adopted decisions for applying the “Regional Ap-
proach to the Southeast European States” in which the general require-
ments for all states are defined and the specific requirements for each in-
dividual state as it passes through the three preparatory stages in its rela-
tions with the EU (autonomous trade preferences, PHARE Programme
and Co-operation Agreement).
To retain the status of autonomous trade preferences, it is necessary to
make progress in consolidating democracy, practising the rule of law,
guaranteeing human and minority rights, and developing a market econ-
omy.
To be admitted to the PHARE programme, Croatia must demonstrate its
intention to carry out democratic reforms, adhere to the generally ac-
knowledged standards of human and minority rights, fulfil obligations
from peace agreements, co-operate with the ICTY, revise the agreements
between Croatia and the Federation of B-H to bring them in line with the
Dayton Accords, respect human and minority rights, create real possibili-
ties for the return of refugees and displaced persons, carry out economic
reforms, co-operate with the neighbouring states and practice open rela-
tions, including the free movement of persons and goods.
The general conditions for concluding a Co-operation Agreement include:
1) creating conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons, 2)
readmitting nationals currently in the EU Member States, 3) co-operating
with the ICTY, 4) carrying out democratic reforms and respecting human
and minority rights, 5) guaranteeing free elections, 6) guaranteeing non-
discrimination of minorities, 7) ensuring non-discrimination of the inde-
pendent media; 8) implementing the first phases of the economic reforms,
9) practising good neighbourly and open relations with the states in theCraotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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region, 10) revising the agreements between the Federation of B-H and
Croatia to conform with the Dayton Accords.
In addition to the above requirements, Croatia must fulfil the following
specific conditions in order to be eligible to conclude a Co-operation
Agreement: 1) meet the obligations arising from the Basic Agreement and
from the co-operation with OSCE and UNTAES, 2) open customs border-
crossings between Croatia and the Republika Srpska of B-H, 3) exert
pressure on the Croats in B-H to dissolve the institutions of Herzeg-
Bosnia, support the Federation of B-H and co-operate with the ICTY.
Croatia has taken action to resolve all the matters related to these issues,
as a result of which it has succeeded in fulfilling the above-mentioned
conditions specified by the EU. Although there is still room for progress
in some areas, there is nothing to support allegations that the Croatian
Government’s efforts to improve the general situation in the country are
insufficient. This also applies in regard to its efforts to improve all aspects
of its relations with the neighbouring states.
The semi-annual reports of the European Commission and subsequent
adoption of the decisions of the EU Council of Ministers opened up only
two opportunities for the said states to truly make progress in the institu-
tionalisation of their respective relations with the EU within a period of
one year.
As regards institutional preparations to strengthen relations with the EU,
considerable progress was made in 1998 when the Office for European
Integration and the European Integration Co-ordination were established,
thus creating an effective mechanism at the level of the Croatian Govern-
ment to focus on improving relations with the EU.
At a meeting of the European Council held in December 1998 at Vienna,
it was decided that, after the Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force, work
should commence on shaping a Common Strategy for the Western Bal-
kans in the form of a new instrument of the Common EU Foreign and
Security Policies. Although geographically a part of Central Europe,Ivo Sanader
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Croatia found itself in this group of countries due to its important and
constructive role in the political stabilisation of the neighbouring region.
This decision of the European Council clearly reflects the great impor-
tance the EU attributes to regulating its relations to the states included in
this regional approach. Moreover, it also implies that within the EU the
belief is emerging that certain modifications are needed in the current
policy toward these states.
3. Croatia and the EU regional approach
Given these circumstances, the Croatian policy is to try to establish good
partnership relations with all EU countries and, at the same time, regulate
them contractually. On the other hand, the pace of Croatia’s rapproche-
ment to the EU is dependent on the so-called policy of conditionality that
is part of its regional policy approach. The Croatian Government is aware
that EU relations to third countries are generally subject to such political
approach. In other words, this policy does not focus exclusively on the
East-European or Western Balkan countries (the latest terminus techni-
cus!).  Croatia is also included in this category of Western Balkan states,
although it in fact fulfils the EU criteria for Central European countries.
The reasons for such classification are first and foremost the Dayton Ac-
cords and the efforts to keep the peace process in B-H on track, where
Croatia is needed as a stabilising factor. In addition, as mentioned above,
relations between Croatia and the EU are not regulated by contract.
Moreover, the decisions by the Council of Ministers of 29 April 1997
also contain a series of conditions that can easily be identified within the
framework of the Copenhagen criteria. This includes emphasis on the
principles of democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human and mi-
nority rights, developing a market economy and regional co-operation. In
addition to Croatia’s specific commitments arising from the Dayton and
Erdut Accords and the requirement that it co-operate with the Hague Tri-
bunal and the OSCE Mission, Croatia must also fulfil the other conditions
required of all candidates for EU membership. Unlike the CopenhagenCraotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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criteria for EU membership, the so-called “carrot” was the retention of
autonomous trade preference, admission to the PHARE programme and
only then the signing of the Co-operation Agreement. In this context it is
important to stress that the assessment of compliance is ultimately left to
the discretion of the EU Member States, based on reports and recommen-
dations of the European Commission. Today, however, Croatian diplo-
macy has largely succeeded in eliminating some previous tendencies fa-
vouring a collective instead of an individual assessment of the countries in
Southeast Europe. Such assessment was likely to make Croatia or other
country a hostage of the current situation in the region. Anyway, the atti-
tude now appears to prevail among the EU Member States that each
country should be considered and evaluated individually, i.e., on its own
merits.
The Royaumont process proposed by the EU should also be mentioned in
this context. It attempts to encourage good neighbourly relations among
the states of Southeast Europe and guarantee stability by initiating ad-
vanced co-operation between NGOs and civil groups. This should be
achieved above all by gaining support for and implementing the Dayton
Peace Agreement. Like the SECI, the Royaumont process is a typical ex-
ample of regional co-operation backed by leading international players,
such as the EU and the USA. In this connection the question arises as to
whether the EU would be better advised to support original regional ini-
tiatives more actively such as the CEI, instead of introducing a series of
new initiatives. This would certainly yield better results. In other words,
whenever possible, solutions should not be imposed; they should be found
by entering into a dialogue with the countries concerned.
It should be noted that Croatia has reached a stage in its relations with the
EU where it enjoys only trade preference. Although the questions of its
admission to the PHARE programme and the signing of the Co-operation
Agreement were once on the table, they have now been made contingent
upon the Stabilisation Agreement and the Stabilisation Pact for Southeast
Europe. It is true that a political dialogue is ongoing between Croatia andIvo Sanader
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the EU; however, in our opinion, it has not yet received the needed im-
petus, as a result of which the process has evoked a number of adverse
economic and political effects.
4. Insufficient institutionalisation of Croatia’s
relations with the EU
The main shortcoming in Croatia’s relations with the EU has been the
failure to take account of Croatia’s economic and cultural adherence to
Central Europe. This shortcoming has deprived Croatia economically and
to a certain politically, thus raising two questions: 1) Are the resulting
hardships for Croatia justified and necessary? 2) Would a different policy
achieve better results in the EU’s political priorities vis-à-vis Southeast
Europe?
4.1 Adverse effects on the Croatian economy as a result of
current EU policy
The principal negative effect of EU policy to date is the isolation of
Croatia from the process of European integration, making it impossible
for Croatia to become a viable trading partner in the single market created
by the EU Member States, which is accessible to the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe having Association Agreements with the EU. Direct
adverse effects on the Croatian economy include the following:
- reduced attraction for direct foreign investments,
- insufficient accessibility of Croatia’s domestic economy to the
global economy, and
- problems in the balance of foreign trade and external debt.
One of the chief factors in attracting foreign investments is the accessibil-
ity of goods and services to other domestic or regional markets. The fact
that Croatia must compete with the Central European countries that have
signed Association Agreements with the EU has led to the practical isola-Craotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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tion of Croatia from the West European market, thus making Croatia less
attractive for direct foreign investments in comparison with other Central
European countries. This in itself has weakened Croatia’s ability to join
the global economy. Reduced economic co-operation leads to reduced sci-
entific and technical co-operation, which in turn slows down Croatia’s
scientific and technical development compared to that of the rest of the
world.
The result has been an unfavourable balance of trade due largely to the
types of Croatian products exported to the EU. A high percentage of ex-
ports are resources and products requiring considerable labour (about
50%), i.e., those with a low added value of processing, whereas the per-
centage of know-how products is negligible (about 3%). Most of the ex-
ports include textile products (largely finishing jobs), timber and wood
products, oil products, non-ferrous metals, meat and meat products, non-
metals, iron, steel and fertilisers.
The problems encountered include not only customs barriers but also the
high quality and other standards of West European products. This situa-
tion has developed mainly as a result of Croatia’s partial isolation from
the European market, which is responsible for its lack of appeal to foreign
investments, poor contacts with global trading partners, and weakened
scientific and technical connections.
The problems that have arisen in the balance of foreign trade and the ex-
ternal debt can be attributed to the same cause. It is in this area that
Croatia has achieved the poorest results compared to the first five coun-
tries that are candidates for EU membership. These problems are com-
pounded by uncertainty about future trends – again because of Croatia’s
isolation from the markets of Central and West Europe.
The external debt accounted for 28% of Croatia’s GNP in 1998, which is
rather low in comparison with some of the first five countries that are
candidates for EU membership. For example, the external debt of the
Czech Republic accounted for 40% of its GNP, in Hungary more than
30%. However, the cause for concern is the current tendency character-Ivo Sanader
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ised by a continued rise in Croatia’s foreign trade deficit that threatens to
disrupt the macro-economic stability of the Croatian economy. As far as
inflation and budgetary stability is concerned, Croatia can boast of far
better results than other Central European countries in transition: an an-
nual inflation rate of 2-3% and a budget deficit of 1-2%. By comparison,
Hungary, Poland and Estonia had double-digit inflation in 1998; only the
Czech Republic and Slovenia managed to keep inflation at 9%. As for the
countries in the second round of EU-expansion, their rate of inflation is
much higher. In Romania, for example, inflation reached 57% in 1998.
From the above it follows that the adverse effects of Croatia’s isolation
from the process of European integration have created a tense and serious
economic situation.
4.2  Adverse political effects
Croatia is committed to achieving lasting peace and stability in neigh-
bouring Southeast Europe. Guided by this objective, Croatia has em-
barked on many highly demanding activities over the past ten years, inde-
pendently or in co-operation with the international community.
Although there have been ups and downs in the relations between the Re-
public of Croatia and the EU, Croatia’s European orientation was clear
from the very beginning of independence. Deeply rooted in the history
and tradition of the Croatian people, our faith in the achievements of
European civilisation has never waned, not even when we expected pro-
tection and encouragement from Europe to pursue our goals. However,
the treatment of Croatia by the EU Member States is more severe than
that of the other Central European countries. This has often been per-
ceived as unjust and unfair, especially in view of the aggression Croatia
endured, the victims and destruction suffered in the struggle for inde-
pendence and Croatia’s substantial contribution to establish peace and sta-
bility in the region. Such treatment is harmful to the interests of the EU in
Croatia and the region at large. Above all it creates mistrust in the Croa-
tian public and discourages pro-European forces on the Croatian politicalCraotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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scene, thus playing into the hands of those who are not overly anxious to
see Croatia enter the Euro-Atlantic and global integration processes.
What Croatia needs is constructive and positive treatment. This is all the
more important because of the unfavourable conditions under which the
economic and democratic transition has taken place.
Contrary to Croatian interests and international efforts as well, the policy
of isolating Croatia from the integration process and consequently from
economic, scientific and technical development creates unnecessary and,
in our opinion, undeserved economic difficulties and social tensions.
This, in turn, makes it more difficult for Croatia to fulfil its constructive
role as a promoter of peace.
5. Progress made by Croatia vis-à-vis the EU
As a result of numerous diplomatic initiatives, progress has been made in
Croatia’s relations with the EU. Therefore, the time has come for the
European Union to reassess and re-evaluate Croatia’s achievements.
Let us briefly summarise activities in Croatia over the past years. The be-
ginning of The UN peacekeeping mission UNPROFOR began in 1992,
followed by UNCRO; however, little progress was made and the results
are not worth mentioning because the UN troops only created a buffer
zone. At that time the situation in Croatia resembled the so-called “Cy-
prus syndrome” all too much. As proposed under the Kinkel-Juppé plan,
Croatia was offered the same “carrot” in 1993: the PHARE Programme.
As mentioned earlier, Croatia was admitted to the Programme for a short
time and even signed a Co-operation Agreement with the EU. By liberat-
ing its occupied territories, Croatia solved its major problem and with it
the crisis that had dragged on for several years in the hands of the inter-
national community. Moreover,  together with the Bosnian Army and the
Croatian Defence Council of B-H, Croatian police and military actions suc-
ceeded in liberating the entire Southwest Bosnia, thus helping to break the
siege of the so-called Bihaæ pocket, which was close to suffering the sameIvo Sanader
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tragic fate as the UN safe havens Žepa and Srebrenica. The above-
mentioned moves by the Croatian political leadership undoubtedly created
the necessary conditions that enabled the international community, led by
the United States, to bring about the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.
Croatia’s readiness to co-operate continued throughout the UNTAES
mandate up to the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region.
A number of measures taken by the Croatian political leadership, such as
the Amnesty and Convalidation Acts, substantially facilitated the peaceful
reintegration of the Croatia Danube region. In this context one should also
mention the current Plan for the Return of Refugees and Displaced Per-
sons and the reconstruction process in general. In addition to the decisive
role played by UNTAES, one should not forget the important contribution
of the Serb population, which actively participated in the peaceful settle-
ment of the crisis by co-operating in the demilitarisation, the municipal
elections and the process of establishing local authorities.
In regard to regional co-operation, Croatia is pursuing an active policy to
normalise relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition
to the large number of bilateral agreements already concluded, a dialogue
has begun with the aim of finding a long-term solution to the security issue
concerning the Prevlaka peninsula. Croatia has contributed to the imple-
mentation of the Dayton Accords, inter alia, by signing the Agreement on
the Use of the Port of Ploèe and Transit through Neum and the Agreement
on Special Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Relations with neighbouring states can be de-
scribed as very good, especially with Italy, Hungary and Austria. Despite
some unresolved issues, relations with Slovenia are developing favoura-
bly. As regards unresolved issues in connection with the disintegration of
former Yugoslavia, Croatia favours finding adequate solutions in a legally
acceptable manner - either in the spirit of good neighbourly contacts or by
international arbitration.
Other priorities of Croatian policy are developing and consolidating de-
mocracy, protecting human and minority rights, respecting freedom of the
media, practising effective rule of law and developing a market economy.Craotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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Considerable progress was made in each of these areas last year. Democ-
racy is maturing every day, and its values are being increasingly incorpo-
rated into Croatian society.
The progress described above represents only part of Croatia’s achieve-
ments, all of which have been the result of constructive work in difficult
circumstances, which - in our opinion - has not been sufficiently appreci-
ated and valued by the EU.
This is particularly true if one takes account of the fact that, in many re-
spects, Croatia’s economic successes over the past few years satisfy the
criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union: a low inflation rate of 3%,
economic growth rate of 6%, a household deficit of about 1%, and a bal-
anced ratio between the foreign debt and foreign currency reserves.
In regard to the so-called policy of conditionality, our relations with the
EU can be described in terms of economic co-operation, humanitarian
aid, and significant contributions to the reconstruction of the infrastruc-
ture destroyed in the war. Last year 57% of Croatian trade was with EU
Member States. Italy, Germany, and Austria are Croatia’s leading trade
partners. This best shows how important trade preferences are for the
Croatian economy, and how important it would be for Croatia to conclude
a Co-operation Agreement i.e. the Agreement on Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation provided for by the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. This
would surely create additional opportunities for economic co-operation.
The EU should regard Croatia as an important importer of West European
products, i.e., as a country that in its own way creates employment for
EU citizens, thus contributing to the policy of preserving jobs within the
EU. This applies particularly to Germany since most of Croatia’s imports
come from this country.
The Croatian Government is very grateful to the European Union for its
generous humanitarian aid during the years of crisis. This gave Croatia
the hope that the EU Member States would continue their support by
contributing to the reconstruction projects conducted by the Croatian
Government. Croatia’s expectations were fulfilled at the Conference onIvo Sanader
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Reconstruction and Development held 4 and 5 December 1998. Finally,
one should not forget that, in addition to the OSCE Mission, there is still
an active EU Monitoring Mission in Croatia. Finally, agreement has been
reached on the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between
Croatia and the EU, which can be regarded as a big step forward.
6. New Developments in relations between Croatia
and the EU until 1999
The aggressive policy of the Serbian regime, which practically dominated
the last decade by systematically generating instability in Southeast
Europe, has turned inward, the victims this time being the Kosovo Alba-
nians. Struck by the brutal escalation of violence and fearing the results of
another round of ethnic cleansing, the international community, led by
NATO, launched a military intervention, the Allied Force operation, on
24 March 1999.
This put Croatia again in the position of a so-called front line state. Croa-
tia supported the NATO operation from the very beginning and consis-
tently met all obligations arising from UN Security Council resolutions
involving sanctions against the FRY.
Croatia also sent humanitarian aid to Albania and Macedonia to help ac-
commodate the Kosovo refugees. Since many Kosovo Albanians have
relatives in Croatia, refugees were accepted based on the principle of
family reunion. In addition, as many as 5000 refugees were accepted who
chose to come to Croatia of their own free will.
As one of the front line states, Croatia participated in meetings arranged
by the EU at Petersberg and Luxembourg. On these occasions the Croa-
tian Foreign Minister, Dr. Graniæ, and the Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr.
Sanader, presented Croatia’s positions on the Kosovo crisis, proposed ways
to alleviate the humanitarian disaster, and discussed a possible Croatian
contribution. At the invitation of Mrs. Albright, US Secretary of State, Dr.
Graniæ attended the meeting between the font line states and the NATOCraotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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Member States in Brussels. In late April of 1999, Dr. Graniæ attended the
NATO summit in Washington on the occasion of the fiftieth Anniversary
of NATO.
The Kosovo crisis made it quite clear that the foreign policy positions of
the EU and Croatia are very similar. This is an important step towards
strengthening co-operation in the field of Common Foreign and Security
Policy modelled on the example of associated members of the EU. Partici-
pating in a regular political dialogue with the EU, associate members enjoy
a considerably higher level of co-operation in this field.
The 3rd Euro-Mediterranean Conference was held in April 1999 at Stutt-
gart. At the invitation of Germany, Croatia participated as a diplomatic
guest for the first time. This sent another signal to the EU and the non-EU
Mediterranean States indicating the Mediterranean, i.e. Adriatic orientation
of our country.
The German initiative for a Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is one of
the main novelties in the EU policy toward this part of Europe. It is an at-
tempt to co-ordinate efforts in the search for a way to institute lasting peace
and stability in the region by proposing a uniform policy to be followed by
all international organisations and major states.
Adopted at the Conference of Ministers in Cologne on 10 June 1999, the
Pact aims to promote and above all strengthen stability in the region in all
segments of security, economy and democracy, thus making it easier for
the Southeast European states to participate in the Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. Croatia views this as an opportunity to strengthen its relations with the
EU by actively supporting implementation of the Pact, just as it did during
the drafting process.
From the Croatian point of view, it is important to note that, in accordance
with the Royaumont Process, the Pact represents the broadest framework
for Southeast European states with different degrees of institutional rela-
tions with the EU. During the process of stabilisation, a regional table will
be responsible for the implementation of the Pact. In addition, there will be
three working tables, one for democracy, economy, and security, each ofIvo Sanader
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which is to be supported by international and regional organisations and
initiatives, as well as by financial institutions.
Recognising the strategic importance of the Pact, Croatia accepts its basic
points and insists that its implementation be based on the principles of
transparency, rationality, efficiency and equality of all participants. Croatia
expects the Pact to facilitate and accelerate its admission into the Euro-
Atlantic integration and strengthen stability in the region, while contribut-
ing significantly to the reconstruction and development of the region. Effi-
cient implementation of the Pact will depend primarily on the organisation
and functioning of the regional policy and working tables. In this respect,
Croatia is looking forward to active and constructive involvement.
The Communication of the Commission on the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Process for Countries of Southeast Europe of 26 May 1999 is ex-
tremely important for the further dynamics and quality of relations between
Croatia and the EU. Croatia welcomes the decision of the Council of Min-
isters to adopt the Commission Communication as the formal beginning of
a process that will lead to a more modern and appropriate method of com-
munication between Croatia and the EU.
The Stabilisation and Association Process stands a good chance of becom-
ing part of a long-term Common Strategy for the so-called West Balkans to
be adopted by the European Council at the close of the Finnish Presidency
of the EU Council of Ministers.
Unlike the 1997 regional approach, the new European Commission docu-
ment, i.e., the parts on the future Stabilisation and Association Agreement
explicitly provide that the states included have the possibility to join the
EU after satisfying the requirements of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Co-
penhagen criteria. The document specifies that the prerequisites for the be-
ginning of negotiations remain the same as those laid down in the decisions
of the EU Council of Ministers of April 1997.
Croatia maintains that this new type of contractual relations should be ad-
justed to each individual state in accordance with its specific needs so as to
take account of the progress of each state in its relations with the EU. TheCraotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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concept of regional co-operation as envisioned in the Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreement needs further explanation.
Croatia’s view of the proposal of the European Commission for setting up
the political dialogue is very positive, even before the negotiations on the
new Stabilisation and Association Agreement have begun. Croatia believes
that the new approach will bring order to the ad hoc dialogue practised to
date, which was too dependent on current circumstances and short-term
considerations, with too little focus on resolving specific issues.
It is necessary to intensify the political dialogue at both the ministerial and
expert levels and schedule bilateral and multilateral meetings for this pur-
pose.
Croatia welcomes the Commission’s intention to enhance co-operation
aimed at developing democracy, civil groups and institutions. The intention
of the EU initiative to establish co-operation in judicial matters and internal
affairs is also welcome and considered necessary, especially with respect to
establishing more effective border controls and combating organised crime
and corruption, tasks which definitely have priority in Croatia.
Individualisation of the system of EU autonomous trade preferences to take
account of each individual state, including Croatia, and increases in eco-
nomic and financial assistance are surely the most specific elements of the
new document of the European Commission. This makes it possible to find
legal grounds for utilising the EU instruments, i.e. funds, which was earlier
impossible for Croatia due to its suspension from the PHARE Programme.
The document of the European Commission and the future Common Strat-
egy for implementation of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe provide a
new positive framework within which Croatia should be able to join the
process of establishing institutional relations with the EU rather quickly,
thus bringing it closer to the candidate states.Ivo Sanader
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7. Goal of the Republic of Croatia, conditionality and
membership application
Full membership in the EU is a priority strategic goal of Croatian policy,
as reiterated on several occasions in a number of declarations and deci-
sions of the President of the Republic, the Government and the Parlia-
ment.
Without a doubt Croatia’s desire to achieve this goal follows from a close
political, economic, and cultural connection and co-operation with the EU
and its member states.
Croatia is aware of the fact that it wants to and is able to consolidate its
democratic order based on free elections and a free market economy
within the broad process of European integration anchored in the EU,
thus enabling it to achieve its strategic goal.
Believing that the stability of a democratic pluralistic society can be guar-
anteed only through the effective functioning of freely elected institutions
as specified in the Constitution, Croatia has held a number of elections at
the national level since 1990: two presidential elections (1992, 1997) and
five parliamentary elections.  The first democratic parliamentary elections
were held in 1990 for the then tricameral Parliament. Thereafter, elec-
tions have been held twice for the House of Representatives (Zastupnièki
dom) (1992, 1995), and twice for the House of Counties (Županijski dom)
(1993, 1997). County and municipal elections have also been held regu-
larly.
By joining efforts and co-operating with the other democratic states of
Europe, Croatia wishes to achieve democratic stability, ensure economic
development and promote prosperity and social well-being. In reaffirming
its own identity and role, Croatia hopes to make a contribution to the po-
litical and economic development of Europe in general and to its immedi-
ate neighbourhood in particular, which above all needs peace, stability,
economic development and reconstruction.Craotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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In order to achieve this goal, Croatia is ready to do whatever it takes,
provided the conditions are the same for all states applying for EU mem-
bership.
As decided by the European Council at its meeting held 21-22 June 1993
in Copenhagen, applicants for full membership must show that they have
achieved:
- stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and rights of minorities,
- a functioning market economy that is able to compete with market
forces within the Union, and
- the ability to take on obligations of membership, including compli-
ance with the political, economic and monetary goals laid down by
the respective institutions of the Union.
The Council’s decisions also take account of the Union’s ability to absorb
new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration.
As far as Croatia is concerned, the general and specific requirements ap-
ply which are specified in the decisions of the EU Council of Ministers of
April 1997 and, in the broadest sense, fall within the Copenhagen criteria.
With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, Art. O, which pro-
vides that all European States are able to apply for EU membership, was
revised by incorporating a reference to Art. F (1). This provision speci-
fies that the Union is based on the principles of freedom and democracy,
including respect for human rights, civil rights and the rule of law. This
revision strengthens the political aspect of membership requirements,
which Croatia fully understands and supports as it is consistent with our
national interests.
As can be seen from the periodical reports of the European Commission
on progress in conditionality and various agencies of the Government,
Croatian policy is continuously developing in all fields, although numer-
ous corrections are still needed in some segments.Ivo Sanader
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Looking back over the past ten or so years, Croatia has constantly had to
overcome various difficulties in its struggle for independence, the process
of creating institutions of state, the transformation from a wartime, de-
fence-oriented economy to one of peace, and the transition from a planned
economy to a free market economy. After all of this, Croatia is now fac-
ing new challenges in its course of action to meet the requirements for EU
membership.
Nonetheless, Croatia is committed to carrying out the political, economic,
legal and institutional reforms required to gradually satisfy the require-
ments of the acquis communautaire. Croatia expects to receive appropri-
ate assistance from EU institutions to help it through this complex proc-
ess, as did the other countries in transition from Central and Eastern
Europe.
It should be noted that further reforms will be carried out as required by
the 1995 White Paper of the European Commission on the preparation for
integration of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe into
the internal market of the Union. Moreover, the 1997 European Commis-
sion document known as Agenda 2000 will provide valuable assistance
during the adjustment process in order to ensure the effective and co-
ordinated operation of state administrative organs. In preparation for ad-
mission to the accession process, Croatia is carefully studying the experi-
ences of the neighbouring countries, so as to be able to respond effec-
tively to the requirements specified in the accession process and accession
partnership.
Once the Stabilisation and Association Agreement is concluded, Croatia
will also decide about submitting a formal application for EU member-
ship. In the meantime, the political transformation continues: further de-
mocratisation, emphasis on the rule of law and the protection of human
and minority rights, implementation of the Dayton Accords, improvement
of regional co-operation, normalisation of relations with the neighbouring
states, and Croatia’s role as a generator of stability.Craotia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership
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In 1999, the new election law will be adopted on the basis of the consen-
sus of all political parties, thus creating the conditions for free and fair
elections. Respecting the separation of powers, especially the independ-
ence of the judiciary, is a clear priority of Croatian policy. Guaranteeing
freedom of the media, including reforms in the area of electronic media,
is another priority of the Croatian Government. Assisted by valuable
counselling by experts of the Council of Europe, the EU and OSCE, the
Croatian Government is striving to find the best ways to strengthen the
democratic order. In co-operation with experts of the Council of Europe,
there is an on-going review of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights
and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Mi-
norities in the Republic of Croatia. Application of the said Law, in com-
bination with the mechanisms provided by the Framework Convention of
the Council of Europe for the Protection of National Minorities, to which
Croatia is a party, will guarantee good protection of human and minority
rights in accordance with the highest European standards. At the same
time, the Government is taking resolute measures to speed up the return
of displaced persons. This includes all Croatian citizens, Croats as well as
Croatian Serbs and members of other minorities. This requires the quick
and effective resolution of all open issues: humanitarian and social issues,
property issues, economic and development issues. Finally, Croatia is
dedicated to intensifying diplomatic activities to improve relations with B-
H (the Federation of B-H and the Republika Srpska) and ensure imple-
mentation of the Dayton Accords.
Having accepted all these tasks, Croatia is committed to carrying them
out, not only for its own benefit but also as a means of guaranteeing that
all segments of its society will function in accordance with the highest
European standards.
Taking account of all that has been stated above, as well as the experi-
ences of other candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will duly carry out all necessary activities, in
co-operation with the Ministry for European Integration, to establish aIvo Sanader
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negotiating team and co-ordinate negotiations with the EU. The main
model in this process will be the one established during the negotiations
between Croatia and the EU in 1995.ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-933307-59-7
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